diff --git a/pkg/tbtc/signer/src/engine/frost_ops.rs b/pkg/tbtc/signer/src/engine/frost_ops.rs
index 018ffdb274..cae05637c6 100644
--- a/pkg/tbtc/signer/src/engine/frost_ops.rs
+++ b/pkg/tbtc/signer/src/engine/frost_ops.rs
@@ -172,10 +172,45 @@ pub fn dkg_part3(request: DkgPart3Request) -> Result<DkgPart3Result, EngineError
     Ok(result)
 }
 
+/// The stateless `generate_nonces_and_commitments` / `sign_share` FFI
+/// primitives hand a one-time signing nonce pair out to the host and later
+/// accept it back as opaque `nonces_hex`. That leaves nonce custody -- and
+/// the single-use invariant -- entirely with the caller (the `SignShareRequest`
+/// contract even states the caller "is cryptographically responsible for
+/// single use"). A host bug or compromise that replays one `nonces_hex`
+/// across two distinct signing packages produces two Schnorr shares under
+/// the same nonce, which algebraically solves for the long-term secret
+/// share. Unlike the deterministic StartSignRound/FinalizeSignRound path --
+/// which is already fenced off in production by
+/// `enforce_transitional_signing_disabled_in_production` -- these primitives
+/// had no production gate, so a production signer could be driven through
+/// them and inherit that blast radius. Fail closed under the production
+/// profile: production signing must use the interactive FROST path
+/// (`interactive.rs`), where the engine retains nonce custody and enforces
+/// durable single-use consumption markers. Non-production profiles keep the
+/// primitives available for the transitional/host-orchestrated flow and for
+/// tests.
+pub(crate) fn enforce_stateless_nonce_primitives_disabled_in_production(
+    operation: &str,
+) -> Result<(), EngineError> {
+    if signer_profile_is_production() {
+        return Err(EngineError::LifecyclePolicyRejected {
+            session_id: operation.to_string(),
+            reason_code: "stateless_nonce_primitives_disabled_in_production".to_string(),
+            detail: format!(
+                "stateless host-custody nonce primitive [{operation}] is disabled when {TBTC_SIGNER_PROFILE_ENV}={TBTC_SIGNER_PROFILE_PRODUCTION}; production signing must use the interactive FROST path, which keeps nonce custody inside the engine and enforces single-use nonces"
+            ),
+        });
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 pub fn generate_nonces_and_commitments(
     request: GenerateNoncesAndCommitmentsRequest,
 ) -> Result<GenerateNoncesAndCommitmentsResult, EngineError> {
     enforce_provenance_gate()?;
+    enforce_stateless_nonce_primitives_disabled_in_production("GenerateNoncesAndCommitments")?;
 
     let key_package = decode_key_package(
         "GenerateNoncesAndCommitments",
@@ -235,6 +270,7 @@ pub fn new_signing_package(
 
 pub fn sign_share(request: SignShareRequest) -> Result<SignShareResult, EngineError> {
     enforce_provenance_gate()?;
+    enforce_stateless_nonce_primitives_disabled_in_production("SignShare")?;
 
     let signing_package_bytes = decode_hex_field(
         "SignShare",
diff --git a/pkg/tbtc/signer/src/engine/tests.rs b/pkg/tbtc/signer/src/engine/tests.rs
index b00f624fe9..f0da8e24d7 100644
--- a/pkg/tbtc/signer/src/engine/tests.rs
+++ b/pkg/tbtc/signer/src/engine/tests.rs
@@ -4685,6 +4685,86 @@ fn finalize_sign_round_rejects_transitional_signing_in_production_profile() {
     clear_state_storage_policy_overrides();
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn stateless_nonce_primitives_reject_under_production_profile() {
+    let _guard = lock_test_state();
+    reset_for_tests();
+
+    // Build real, secret-bearing inputs under the development profile: valid
+    // key packages, a nonce pair per signer, and a signing package. Both
+    // stateless primitives must succeed here, proving the production gate does
+    // not regress the transitional/host-orchestrated path or the test path.
+    let fixture = deterministic_interactive_dkg_fixture(7);
+    let mut part3_results = BTreeMap::new();
+    for (id, request) in fixture.part3_requests {
+        part3_results.insert(id, dkg_part3(request).expect("DKG part3"));
+    }
+
+    let signing_participants = [1u16, 2];
+    let mut commitments = Vec::new();
+    let mut nonces_by_participant = BTreeMap::new();
+    for id in signing_participants {
+        let result = generate_nonces_and_commitments(GenerateNoncesAndCommitmentsRequest {
+            key_package_identifier: part3_results[&id].key_package.identifier.clone(),
+            key_package_hex: part3_results[&id].key_package.data_hex.clone(),
+        })
+        .expect("development profile generates nonces");
+        commitments.push(result.commitment);
+        nonces_by_participant.insert(id, result.nonces_hex);
+    }
+    let signing_package = new_signing_package(NewSigningPackageRequest {
+        message_hex: hex::encode([0x11u8; 32]),
+        commitments,
+    })
+    .expect("development profile builds signing package");
+    sign_share(SignShareRequest {
+        signing_package_hex: signing_package.signing_package_hex.clone(),
+        nonces_hex: nonces_by_participant[&1].clone().into(),
+        key_package_identifier: part3_results[&1].key_package.identifier.clone(),
+        key_package_hex: part3_results[&1].key_package.data_hex.clone().into(),
+    })
+    .expect("development profile signs share");
+
+    // Flip to the production profile with valid provenance configured so the
+    // primitives reach the new gate rather than tripping the provenance gate
+    // first. Feed the SAME secret key package, host-custody nonces, and
+    // signing package that just succeeded: production must now fail closed
+    // BEFORE any secret is deserialized (the gate is the second statement of
+    // each primitive, ahead of decode_key_package / nonce deserialization).
+    configure_valid_provenance_attestation_for_tests();
+    let _signer_profile = SignerProfileGuard::production();
+
+    let nonces_err = generate_nonces_and_commitments(GenerateNoncesAndCommitmentsRequest {
+        key_package_identifier: part3_results[&1].key_package.identifier.clone(),
+        key_package_hex: part3_results[&1].key_package.data_hex.clone(),
+    })
+    .expect_err("production profile must refuse to mint host-custody nonces");
+    let EngineError::LifecyclePolicyRejected { reason_code, .. } = nonces_err else {
+        panic!("unexpected error variant for generate_nonces_and_commitments");
+    };
+    assert_eq!(
+        reason_code,
+        "stateless_nonce_primitives_disabled_in_production"
+    );
+
+    let share_err = sign_share(SignShareRequest {
+        signing_package_hex: signing_package.signing_package_hex.clone(),
+        nonces_hex: nonces_by_participant[&1].clone().into(),
+        key_package_identifier: part3_results[&1].key_package.identifier.clone(),
+        key_package_hex: part3_results[&1].key_package.data_hex.clone().into(),
+    })
+    .expect_err("production profile must refuse to sign a host-supplied nonce");
+    let EngineError::LifecyclePolicyRejected { reason_code, .. } = share_err else {
+        panic!("unexpected error variant for sign_share");
+    };
+    assert_eq!(
+        reason_code,
+        "stateless_nonce_primitives_disabled_in_production"
+    );
+
+    reset_for_tests();
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn start_sign_round_accepts_valid_attempt_context_in_roast_strict_mode() {
     let _guard = lock_test_state();