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fix(kms): scope the onboarding os_image_hash fallback to legacy certificates #1313

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Merged
kvinwang merged 1 commit into from
Sep 22, 2026
Merged

fix(kms): scope the onboarding os_image_hash fallback to legacy certificates #1313

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8 changes: 5 additions & 3 deletions dstack/kms/src/main_service/upgrade_authority.rs
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ use http_client::prpc::PrpcClient;
use ra_tls::attestation::{AttestationVerifier, VerifiedAttestation, VersionedAttestation};
use serde::de::DeserializeOwned;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use tracing::warn;

/// The KMS `bootAuth` payload. This is the verifier's `PolicyBootInfo` — the one
/// canonical struct shared by the producer (KMS) and the policy input the
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -254,10 +255,11 @@ pub(crate) async fn ensure_kms_allowed(
.context("failed to build KMS boot info from attestation")?;
// Workaround: old source KMS instances use the legacy cert format (separate TDX_QUOTE +
// EVENT_LOG OIDs) which lacks vm_config, resulting in an empty os_image_hash.
// Fill it from the local KMS's own value. This is safe because mrAggregated already
// validates OS image integrity transitively through the RTMR measurement chain.
// Fill it from the local KMS's own value, so only mrAggregated gates the source image here.
// A source that presents a config but no os_image_hash is not legacy and gets no fallback.
// TODO: remove once all source KMS instances use the unified PHALA_RATLS_ATTESTATION format.
if boot_info.os_image_hash.is_empty() {
if boot_info.os_image_hash.is_empty() && attestation.config.is_empty() {
warn!("source KMS uses the legacy cert format, falling back to the local os_image_hash");
let local_info = local_kms_boot_info(verifier)
.await
.context("failed to get local KMS boot info for os_image_hash fallback")?;
Expand Down
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