Add fak (Fused Agent Kernel) to Agent Firewalls & Gateways#58
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anthony-chaudhary wants to merge 1 commit into
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Add fak (Fused Agent Kernel) to Agent Firewalls & Gateways#58anthony-chaudhary wants to merge 1 commit into
anthony-chaudhary wants to merge 1 commit into
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fak is an open-source (Apache-2.0) Go agent kernel that sits on the tool-call path as a default-deny capability gate plus a result quarantine — a direct fit for the Runtime Protection section. Format matches the section's existing entries (bold link, description ending with a period). Signed-off-by: anthony-chaudhary <18080164+anthony-chaudhary@users.noreply.github.com>
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Adds fak to the Agent Firewalls & Gateways (Runtime Protection) section.
fak is an open-source (Apache-2.0) Go "agent kernel": a single binary that sits between an AI agent and its tools and adjudicates every tool call on the same call path before it runs — a default-deny capability gate the model can't talk past (no IPC, fails closed), plus a quarantine that holds suspicious tool results out of the model's context to contain prompt injection and tool poisoning. That's a direct match for this section's framing ("tools that sit between the agent and the world to filter traffic, prevent unauthorized tool access, and block prompt injections").
Checklist against the contribution guidelines:
In the interest of honesty (which the project takes seriously — it ships a machine-checked claims ledger), the result detector is evadable by design; the security floor is the capability lock plus the containment, which an attacker has to beat as two independent gates rather than fooling one classifier.