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Security: dexpace/ruby-sdk

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported versions

Nothing has been published yet. The six gems under gems/ are built, but every one is at 0.0.0 and none is on RubyGems, so there is no released version to support and no patched release to point at. Until the first release, the supported revision is the tip of main — report against a commit SHA. Once a version is published, this section will name the supported release lines.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue, pull request or discussion for a security vulnerability.

Report it privately by email to oaljarrah@dexpace.org with [SECURITY] in the subject line.

Include what you can of the following:

  • The affected gem(s), and the commit SHA and Ruby version you reproduced against
  • A description of the vulnerability and its impact
  • Steps or a proof of concept to reproduce it

You can expect an acknowledgement within a few days. Please allow time for a fix to land and be released before disclosing publicly.

Scope

The SDK is a toolkit: dexpace-core performs no network I/O of its own. In scope here:

  • Credential handling — the Basic, Digest, API-key and bearer-token credentials and stampers, RFC 7235 challenge parsing, and any path by which a credential reaches a log, an exception message, #inspect or pp output.
  • Redaction — URL, query and header redaction in logging and tracing, including a credential surviving in userinfo or in a header outside the allow-list.
  • Redirect safety — Authorization stripped before every re-issue, Cookie and Proxy-Authorization stripped cross-origin, the HTTPS guard on credentials, and scheme downgrades.
  • Request integrity — header-name and header-value validation at the wire boundary (CRLF or request-splitting), and URL handling.
  • Resource exhaustion — the SDK's own bounded buffers, stream line and event caps, pagination caps, and bounded maps.
  • The two transport adapters — dexpace-transport-net_http and dexpace-transport-async_http — as far as their own mapping, TLS settings and cancellation go.

Vulnerabilities in net-http, async-http or json themselves belong upstream; report them there, and tell us if the SDK needs a dependency floor raised.

There aren't any published security advisories