Harden network auth: failed-attempt lockout on sensitive routes + weak-key warning (#660)#663
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…k-key warning (hummingbot#660 §2) The global rate limiter allow-lists all private-network sources (isTrustedLocalAddress), while the API-token auth hook trusts only loopback. A LAN / compose-adjacent client is therefore required to present the token but is NOT rate-limited, so it can brute-force the token against sensitive fund-moving routes at unlimited rate — the gap hummingbot#660 §2 describes. - Add an IP-keyed failed-auth lockout (gateway-security.ts). Only FAILED token checks increment it, so a correctly authenticated client — including a sibling-container bot the rate limiter allow-lists — is never affected; a guessing client is locked out after GATEWAY_AUTH_FAIL_MAX (default 10) failures per GATEWAY_AUTH_FAIL_WINDOW_MS (default 15m). Wired into the existing onRequest auth hook; a successful auth clears the counter. - Warn when an operator-supplied GATEWAY_API_KEY is weak (<16 chars); the auto-generated key is 256-bit. Non-fatal, so existing deployments keep working. - Unit tests for both (isWeakApiKey + lockout threshold / per-source / window-expiry / clear). Scope note: an IP-keyed lockout is a proportionate mitigation for this local/LAN threat model and does not by itself stop IP-rotating attackers (hummingbot#660 §2); the primary defense remains a high-entropy token. Does not touch the general rate limiter, so legitimate bot throughput is unchanged.
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Summary
Follow-up to #652 / #660 §2. When API-token auth is enabled (
GATEWAY_REQUIRE_AUTH/GATEWAY_API_KEY), the token is the only control on network-reachable fund-moving routes — but the anti-brute-force protection has a gap:app.ts) trusts loopback only (isLoopbackAddress).isTrustedLocalAddress→ 10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16).So a LAN- or compose-adjacent client (a sibling container, another host on the same private network) must present the token (it isn't loopback) but is not rate-limited — it can brute-force the token against sensitive routes (
/wallet,/config/update,/restart, connectorexecute/add/remove/open/close, tradingswap/clmm) at unlimited rate. This is the residual #660 §2 describes ("per-route strict limit + lockout after N failed attempts"), and it also contradicts the module's own stated principle that strict rate-limiting/lockout apply only to non-loopback requests.Change
gateway-security.ts, wired into the existingonRequesthook): keyed on source IP, incremented only on a failed token check. A correctly authenticated client — including a sibling-container bot the rate limiter allow-lists — is never affected; a token-guessing client is locked out (429) afterGATEWAY_AUTH_FAIL_MAX(default 10) failures withinGATEWAY_AUTH_FAIL_WINDOW_MS(default 15 min). A successful auth clears the counter.GATEWAY_API_KEYis currently accepted with no strength check; warn (non-fatal) when it is < 16 chars, since a weak operator key plus the unthrottled private-network path is the realistic risk. The auto-generated key is 256-bit and unaffected.Deliberately does not change the general rate limiter (its private-network allow-list is intended to keep legitimate high-volume bot traffic unthrottled), so normal throughput is unchanged.
Scope / limitations
An IP-keyed lockout is a proportionate mitigation for this local/LAN threat model; it does not by itself stop an attacker who can rotate many source IPs (also noted in #660 §2). The primary defense remains a high-entropy token. Credential-keyed lockout and per-route limits can layer on top later.
Testing
pnpm typecheckclean.pnpm lintclean on changed files (0 errors).test/services/gateway-security.test.ts: weak-key detection + lockout threshold / per-source isolation / window expiry / clear-on-success.Refs #652, #660.