OASM is pre-1.0 (0.0.1 in package.json). Only the latest main branch and the most recent release receive security fixes. There is no LTS series.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting — open a draft Security Advisory. This keeps details private until a fix is ready. There is no dedicated security email address; do not post exploit details in public issues or Discord.

If the issue is clearly not sensitive (hardening idea, dependency bump, theoretical concern with no exploit path), a public bug report is fine.

• Affected component (core-api, console, worker, oasm-connectors manifest) and version/commit.
• Steps to reproduce or proof of concept.
• Impact assessment: what an attacker gains (data access, cross-tenant access, RCE, auth bypass).
• Your environment if relevant (Docker Compose, dev mode, production build).

• Reports are triaged by maintainers via the private advisory thread.
• There is no formal SLA — response time depends on severity and maintainer availability.
• Once triaged, fixes land on main and ship with the next release; reporters are credited unless they opt out.

• Worker Docker socket is by design. The worker mounts /var/run/docker.sock to spawn connector containers (docker-compose.yml, worker/internal/runtime/docker.go). The socket is root-equivalent on the host — only run trusted connector images, never expose the worker to untrusted networks.
• Secrets live in .env, never in git. ENCRYPTION_KEYS is order-sensitive (last key encrypts); WORKER_API_KEY must match what the API expects. Leaked-key rotation is an operator responsibility.
• .env / deployment misconfiguration is out of code scope for reports — flag it as a docs issue instead, unless the defect is in source code (e.g. an insecure default constant).

A whitebox audit of core-api (cross-tenant isolation, IDOR, SQLi, auth controls) dated 2026-09-26 is recorded in docs/security-audit-report.md. Remediation status per that report: 22 of 26 findings fixed on branch security-patch-2026-10-03; storage-bucket exposure (AE-02) was reverted at owner request and still stands; CORS/cookie/trusted-origin items were scoped as deployment configuration. Treat the report as a snapshot, not a guarantee — verify against current main.