keep-node

Self-sovereign security appliance for your passwords and secrets.

About

keep-node turns a small Linux box into a private security appliance. Each node runs your core security services (a Vaultwarden password manager, secrets, identity) and holds only a FROST threshold key share, so no single device can decrypt your vault. Run two or more and they sync to each other, so if one goes down the others keep serving. Built for non-technical users: no seed phrases.

Part of the Keep ecosystem; the node daemon, vault, and threshold signing are reused from keep (keep-web, keep-core).

Status: MVP in progress, developed and CI-tested entirely in NixOS VMs (no hardware). Built and validated so far: Vaultwarden + keep-web on a LUKS volume gated at boot, either by a TPM seal (default) or, opt-in, by a threshold-OPRF quorum reconstructed from a live keep relay + a second holder (tested end to end with the real keep binary); opt-in measured boot (Lanzaboote UKI, so the seal binds a real PCR 11); and multi-node active/standby HA for the vault, running over a real nvpn encrypted mesh between nodes (nostr-vpn, boringtun userspace WireGuard, peer-authenticated) , a shared JWT signing key, Litestream WAL streaming of the SQLite DB, attachment/Send file replication, a replication-lag health signal, and crash-then-promote failover, all covered by two-node nixosTests with no relay. Still ahead: the phone holder and QR onboarding (the keep-android app; tests use a keep holder as its stand-in), moving the quorum to 2-of-3, internet NAT traversal for the mesh (nvpn's Nostr discovery + the bundled wisp relay), and running on real hardware (TPM 2.0 + secure element on an SBC).

Features

• Threshold custody: the box holds one FROST share; steal it and get nothing.
• Multi-node HA: nodes sync, so a single failure doesn't take your vault down.
• Seedless: recovery via a device quorum, no 24 words to lose.
• Open: MIT software on commodity hardware.

Quick Start

Requires Nix with flakes enabled.

# Run the test suite (boots a VM, no hardware needed: Vaultwarden + keep-web)
nix flake check

# Boot the VM interactively to poke at it
nix build .#checks.x86_64-linux.single-node.driverInteractive
./result/bin/nixos-test-driver --interactive

Install on hardware

Build a bootable USB installer and install keep-node on a real UEFI machine.

1. Build the installer ISO (requires Nix with flakes; produces a ~1.4 GB UEFI hybrid ISO):

   nix build .#installer-iso
   # ISO at: result/iso/*.iso

   No Nix? Build it in an isolated container instead:

   docker run --rm --privileged -v "$PWD":/work -w /work nixos/nix \
     nix --extra-experimental-features 'nix-command flakes' build .#installer-iso

2. Flash it to a USB stick. This erases the stick: replace /dev/sdX with the real device (verify with lsblk).

   sudo dd if=result/iso/*.iso of=/dev/sdX bs=4M oflag=sync status=progress
   sync

3. Boot the target machine from the USB (UEFI; disable Secure Boot if it won't boot, the image isn't Secure-Boot-signed), then install to the internal disk:

   install-keepnode /dev/sda      # the target's internal disk, NOT the USB

   It auto-elevates, wipes the disk, partitions UEFI, and installs offline. Type YES to confirm. When it finishes, remove the USB and reboot.

4. After first boot, console autologin and SSH are available; default login is root / keepnode, change it immediately (passwd). Find the node's IP with ip a, then open the Vaultwarden web vault from the LAN at https://<node-ip> (self-signed cert, accept the browser warning; plain HTTP won't work because the web vault needs a secure context).

Insecure by design (bring-up only). The installer image is the keepnode-debug profile: it enables an opt-in, test-grade debugAccess config (known root password, password SSH, open signups, self-signed TLS) so a fresh box is reachable over the LAN before the encrypted transport lands. For any real deployment, deploy the hardened nixosConfigurations.keepnode profile instead (debugAccess off, SSH off, signups default-deny), not keepnode-debug. frost-gate is off in both, so Vaultwarden data sits on the plain disk with no TPM unlock yet.

License

MIT