ci: bump rustsec-admin commit

.github/workflows/assign-ids.yml

@@ -23,11 +23,11 @@ jobs:
         uses: actions/cache@55cc8345863c7cc4c66a329aec7e433d2d1c52a9 # v6.1.0
         with:
           path: ~/.cargo/bin
-          key: rustsec-admin-eee63cf3c3916a9b8305678dfb91206acd9e67eb
+          key: rustsec-admin-5a1737650d9b27d38941a23ccca1cfaecf568b63
 
       - name: Install rustsec-admin
         if: steps.admin-cache.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
-        run: cargo install --git https://github.com/rustsec/rustsec rustsec-admin --rev eee63cf3c3916a9b8305678dfb91206acd9e67eb
+        run: cargo install --git https://github.com/rustsec/rustsec rustsec-admin --rev 5a1737650d9b27d38941a23ccca1cfaecf568b63
 
       - name: Assign IDs
         id: assign

.github/workflows/export-osv.yml

@@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ jobs:
         id: admin-cache
         with:
           path: ~/.cargo/bin
-          key: rustsec-admin-eee63cf3c3916a9b8305678dfb91206acd9e67eb
+          key: rustsec-admin-5a1737650d9b27d38941a23ccca1cfaecf568b63
 
       - name: Install rustsec-admin
         if: steps.admin-cache.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
-        run: cargo install --git https://github.com/rustsec/rustsec rustsec-admin --rev eee63cf3c3916a9b8305678dfb91206acd9e67eb
+        run: cargo install --git https://github.com/rustsec/rustsec rustsec-admin --rev 5a1737650d9b27d38941a23ccca1cfaecf568b63
 
       - run: |
           mkdir -p crates

.github/workflows/publish-web.yml

@@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ jobs:
         id: admin-cache
         with:
           path: ~/.cargo/bin
-          key: rustsec-admin-eee63cf3c3916a9b8305678dfb91206acd9e67eb
+          key: rustsec-admin-5a1737650d9b27d38941a23ccca1cfaecf568b63
 
       - name: Install rustsec-admin
         if: steps.admin-cache.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
-        run: cargo install --git https://github.com/rustsec/rustsec rustsec-admin --rev eee63cf3c3916a9b8305678dfb91206acd9e67eb
+        run: cargo install --git https://github.com/rustsec/rustsec rustsec-admin --rev 5a1737650d9b27d38941a23ccca1cfaecf568b63
 
       - run: |
           rustsec-admin web .

.github/workflows/sync-ids.yml

@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ jobs:
         uses: actions/cache@55cc8345863c7cc4c66a329aec7e433d2d1c52a9 # v6.1.0
         with:
           path: ~/.cargo/bin
-          key: rustsec-admin-eee63cf3c3916a9b8305678dfb91206acd9e67eb
+          key: rustsec-admin-5a1737650d9b27d38941a23ccca1cfaecf568b63
 
       - name: Install rustsec-admin
         if: steps.admin-cache.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
-        run: cargo install --git https://github.com/rustsec/rustsec rustsec-admin --rev eee63cf3c3916a9b8305678dfb91206acd9e67eb
+        run: cargo install --git https://github.com/rustsec/rustsec rustsec-admin --rev 5a1737650d9b27d38941a23ccca1cfaecf568b63
 
       - name: Synchronize IDs
         id: sync_ids

.github/workflows/validate.yml

@@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ jobs:
         uses: actions/cache@55cc8345863c7cc4c66a329aec7e433d2d1c52a9 # v6.1.0
         with:
           path: ~/.cargo/bin
-          key: rustsec-admin-eee63cf3c3916a9b8305678dfb91206acd9e67eb
+          key: rustsec-admin-5a1737650d9b27d38941a23ccca1cfaecf568b63
 
       - name: Install rustsec-admin
         if: steps.admin-cache.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
-        run: cargo install --git https://github.com/rustsec/rustsec rustsec-admin --rev eee63cf3c3916a9b8305678dfb91206acd9e67eb
+        run: cargo install --git https://github.com/rustsec/rustsec rustsec-admin --rev 5a1737650d9b27d38941a23ccca1cfaecf568b63
 
       - name: Lint advisories
         run: rustsec-admin lint

crates/anstream/RUSTSEC-2024-0404.md

@@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ considered as some non-printable sequence.
 This will produce a broken str from the incorrectly segmented
 bytes via str::from_utf8_unchecked, and that should never happen.
 
-Full credit goes to @Ralith who reviewed this code and
-asked @burakemir to follow up.
+Full credit goes to [@Ralith](https://github.com/Ralith) who reviewed this code and
+asked [@burakemir](https://github.com/burakemir) to follow up.

crates/cell-project/RUSTSEC-2020-0164.md

@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ So just updating to the latest version will include the fix (which may result in
 
 ## Acknowledgements
 
-This was discovered and fixed by @SoniEx2 in cell-project: [Issues/3] and [Issues/4]
+This was discovered and fixed by [@SoniEx2](https://github.com/SoniEx2) in cell-project: [Issues/3] and [Issues/4]
 
 [issues/3]: https://github.com/RustyYato/cell-project/issues/3
 [issues/4]: https://github.com/RustyYato/cell-project/issues/4

crates/crossbeam-deque/RUSTSEC-2021-0093.md

@@ -18,4 +18,4 @@ In the affected version of this crate, the result of the race condition is that
 
 Crates using `Stealer::steal`, `Stealer::steal_batch`, or `Stealer::steal_batch_and_pop` are affected by this issue.
 
-Credits to @kmaork for discovering, reporting and fixing the bug.
+Credits to [@kmaork](https://github.com/kmaork) for discovering, reporting and fixing the bug.

crates/crossbeam-utils/RUSTSEC-2022-0041.md

@@ -56,4 +56,4 @@ This has been fixed in crossbeam-utils 0.8.7.
 
 Affected 0.8.x releases have been yanked.
 
-Thanks to @taiki-e
+Thanks to [@taiki-e](https://github.com/taiki-e).

crates/crossbeam/RUSTSEC-2018-0009.md

@@ -22,4 +22,4 @@ of double frees.
 The flaw was corrected by wrapping elements inside queues in a
 `ManuallyDrop`.
 
-Thanks to @c0gent for reporting the issue.
+Thanks to [@c0gent](https://github.com/c0gent) for reporting the issue.

crates/prost/RUSTSEC-2020-0002.md

@@ -23,4 +23,5 @@ service attacks, while on architectures without stack probes (like ARM)
 overflowing the stack is unsound and can result in potential memory corruption
 (or even RCE).
 
-The flaw was quickly corrected by @danburkert and released in version 0.6.1.
+The flaw was quickly corrected by [@danburkert](https://github.com/danburkert) and released in
+version 0.6.1.

crates/rand/RUSTSEC-2026-0097.md

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ unaffected = ["< 0.7.0"]
 
 # Rand is unsound with a custom logger using `rand::rng()`
 
-It has been reported (by @lopopolo) that the `rand` library is [unsound](https://rust-lang.github.io/unsafe-code-guidelines/glossary.html#soundness-of-code--of-a-library) (i.e. that safe code using the public API can cause Undefined Behaviour) when all the following conditions are met:
+It has been reported (by [@lopopolo](https://github.com/lopopolo)) that the `rand` library is [unsound](https://rust-lang.github.io/unsafe-code-guidelines/glossary.html#soundness-of-code--of-a-library) (i.e. that safe code using the public API can cause Undefined Behaviour) when all the following conditions are met:
 
 - The `log` and `thread_rng` features are enabled
 - A [custom logger](https://docs.rs/log/latest/log/#implementing-a-logger) is defined

crates/rustls-webpki/RUSTSEC-2026-0049.md

@@ -22,4 +22,4 @@ This vulnerability is thought to be of limited impact. This is because both the
 
 More likely, this bug would be latent in normal use, and an attacker could leverage faulty revocation checking to continue using a revoked credential.
 
-This vulnerability is identified as [GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4](https://github.com/rustls/webpki/security/advisories/GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4). Thank you to @1seal for the report.
+This vulnerability is identified as [GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4](https://github.com/rustls/webpki/security/advisories/GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4). Thank you to [@1seal](https://github.com/1seal) for the report.

crates/rustls-webpki/RUSTSEC-2026-0098.md

@@ -18,4 +18,4 @@ Note this library does not provide an API for asserting URI names, and URI name
 
 Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, this bug is reachable only after signature verification and requires misissuance to exploit.
 
-This vulnerability is identified as [GHSA-965h-392x-2mh5](https://github.com/rustls/webpki/security/advisories/GHSA-965h-392x-2mh5). Thank you to @1seal for the report.
+This vulnerability is identified as [GHSA-965h-392x-2mh5](https://github.com/rustls/webpki/security/advisories/GHSA-965h-392x-2mh5). Thank you to [@1seal](https://github.com/1seal) for the report.

crates/rustls-webpki/RUSTSEC-2026-0099.md

@@ -19,4 +19,4 @@ This is very similar to [CVE-2025-61727](https://go.dev/issue/76442).
 
 Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, this bug is reachable only after signature verification and requires misissuance to exploit.
 
-This vulnerability is identified as [GHSA-xgp8-3hg3-c2mh](https://github.com/rustls/webpki/security/advisories/GHSA-xgp8-3hg3-c2mh). Thank you to @1seal for the report.
+This vulnerability is identified as [GHSA-xgp8-3hg3-c2mh](https://github.com/rustls/webpki/security/advisories/GHSA-xgp8-3hg3-c2mh). Thank you to [@1seal](https://github.com/1seal) for the report.

crates/rustls-webpki/RUSTSEC-2026-0104.md

@@ -21,4 +21,4 @@ This panic is reachable prior to a CRL's signature being verified.
 
 Applications that do not use CRLs are not affected.
 
-Thank you to @tynus3 for the report.
+Thank you to [@tynus3](https://github.com/tynus3) for the report.

crates/smallvec/RUSTSEC-2018-0003.md

@@ -25,4 +25,4 @@ updated to include moved items until they have been removed from their
 original positions.  Items may now be leaked if `Iterator::next` panics, but
 they will not be dropped more than once.
 
-Thank you to @Vurich for reporting this bug.
+Thank you to [@Vurich](https://github.com/Vurich) for reporting this bug.

crates/smallvec/RUSTSEC-2019-0009.md

@@ -22,4 +22,4 @@ Attempting to call `grow` on a spilled SmallVec with a value equal to the curren
 
 An attacker that controls the value passed to `grow` may exploit this flaw to obtain memory contents or gain remote code execution.
 
-Credits to @ehuss for discovering, reporting and fixing the bug.
+Credits to [@ehuss](https://github.com/ehuss) for discovering, reporting and fixing the bug.

crates/smallvec/RUSTSEC-2019-0012.md

@@ -22,4 +22,4 @@ Attempting to call `grow` on a spilled SmallVec with a value less than the curre
 
 An attacker that controls the value passed to `grow` may exploit this flaw to obtain memory contents or gain remote code execution.
 
-Credits to @ehuss for discovering, reporting and fixing the bug.
+Credits to [@ehuss](https://github.com/ehuss) for discovering, reporting and fixing the bug.

crates/smallvec/RUSTSEC-2021-0003.md

@@ -25,4 +25,4 @@ This bug was only triggered if the iterator passed to `insert_many` yielded more
 
 The flaw was corrected in smallvec 0.6.14 and 1.6.1, by ensuring that additional space is always reserved for each item inserted.  The fix also simplified the implementation of `insert_many` to use less unsafe code, so it is easier to verify its correctness.
 
-Thank you to Yechan Bae (@Qwaz) and the Rust group at Georgia Tech’s SSLab for finding and reporting this bug.
+Thank you to Yechan Bae ([@Qwaz](https://github.com/Qwaz)) and the Rust group at Georgia Tech’s SSLab for finding and reporting this bug.

crates/tar/RUSTSEC-2021-0080.md

@@ -57,5 +57,6 @@ fn main() -> Result<()> {
 ```
 
 This has been fixed in https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/pull/259 and is
-published as `tar` 0.4.36. Thanks to Martin Michaelis (@mgjm) for discovering
-and reporting this, and Nikhil Benesch (@benesch) for the fix!
+published as `tar` 0.4.36. Thanks to Martin Michaelis ([@mgjm](https://github.com/mgjm)) for
+discovering and reporting this, and Nikhil Benesch ([@benesch](https://github.com/benesch)) for
+the fix!

crates/zlib-rs/RUSTSEC-2024-0401.md

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ A denial of service vulnerability was found in zlib-rs, triggered by specially c
 
 Due to the way LLVM handles the zlib-rs codebase, tail calls were not guaranteed. This caused certain input patterns to result in a large number of stack frames being required, quickly resulting in a stack overflow. These are unlikely to occur in practice, but a dedicated attacker can construct malicious input files.
 
-After stack overflows were found by @inahga with a fuzzer, we dove into the assembly, and found some cases where the stack grew
+After stack overflows were found by [@inahga](https://github.com/inahga) with a fuzzer, we dove into the assembly, and found some cases where the stack grew
 
 ```asm
 .LBB109_326: