Do NOT file public GitHub issues for security vulnerabilities.
Report security issues to: security@waitdead.com
We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours and aim to provide a fix within 7 days for critical issues.
ForgeGod executes shell commands, reads/writes files, and sends code to LLM APIs. Security issues in scope include:
- Command injection or sandbox bypass
- Path traversal allowing access outside project directory
- Secret/credential exposure to LLM context
- Prompt injection via project files (rules.md, AGENTS.md)
- MCP server compromise vectors
- Authentication bypass or API key exposure
ForgeGod uses two different execution models:
standardmode runs on the host with guardrailsstrictmode requires a real Docker sandbox backend
ForgeGod implements defense-in-depth:
- Real strict sandbox -
strictmode runs commands in a Docker container with--network none,--read-only,--cap-drop ALL,no-new-privileges, and a workspace bind mount - Standard-mode shell policy -
standardmode blocks dangerous command patterns and shell operators such as chaining, pipes, redirection, and command substitution - Isolated process dirs - Host-local guarded execution scopes
HOME, temp, cache, and config directories under.forgegod/sandbox - Secret redaction - API keys and tokens are stripped from tool output before entering LLM context
- Workspace scoping - Agent-driven filesystem and shell execution stay within the active workspace root, and configured
blocked_pathsare enforced - Generated-code validation - Dangerous generated code is flagged on writes and edits;
strictmode blocks suspicious writes - Prompt-injection detection - Project rules and file content are scanned for prompt-injection patterns
- Budget limits - Cost controls prevent runaway API spend
- Killswitch - Create
.forgegod/KILLSWITCHto immediately halt the autonomous loop
- ForgeGod sends file contents and code to third-party LLM APIs. Do not use on repositories containing secrets or proprietary code without appropriate safeguards.
strictmode depends on a usable local Docker daemon and a pre-pulled sandbox image. If those prerequisites are missing, strict execution is blocked.- ForgeGod now includes a strict-sandbox doctor check and a non-technical setup guide in docs/STRICT_SANDBOX_SETUP.md. Prefer that path over disabling
strictfor convenience. - ForgeGod still does not provide microVM isolation, custom seccomp profiles, or a stronger backend than the local Docker Engine.
standardmode is still a host-local guardrailed workflow, not a locked-down profile. Suspicious generated code is blocked only instrictmode.- MCP server connections spawn external processes. Only connect to trusted MCP servers.
- Project rules files (
.forgegod/rules.md,AGENTS.md) are injected into the system prompt. Cloning untrusted repositories may result in prompt injection.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.1.x | Yes |