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chore(deps): update actions/checkout action to v7 - #37

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renovate[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
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renovate/actions-checkout-7.x
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chore(deps): update actions/checkout action to v7#37
renovate[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
mainfrom
renovate/actions-checkout-7.x

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@renovate

@renovate renovate Bot commented Jun 25, 2026

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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Type Update Change
actions/checkout action major v6.0.3v7.0.1
actions/checkout action major v5.0.1v7.0.1
actions/checkout action major v4.3.1v7.0.1

Release Notes

actions/checkout (actions/checkout)

v7.0.1

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v7.0.0

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v7

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v6.1.0

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This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

@greptile-apps

greptile-apps Bot commented Jun 25, 2026

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PR author is in the excluded authors list.

@changeset-bot

changeset-bot Bot commented Jun 25, 2026

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⚠️ No Changeset found

Latest commit: ea8eafe

Merging this PR will not cause a version bump for any packages. If these changes should not result in a new version, you're good to go. If these changes should result in a version bump, you need to add a changeset.

Click here to learn what changesets are, and how to add one.

Click here if you're a maintainer who wants to add a changeset to this PR

@wave-bugbot

wave-bugbot Bot commented Jun 25, 2026

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🌊 WAVE BugBot — 10 finding(s)

🔴 8 · 🟠 2

  • 🔴 P0 .github/workflows/_checks.yml:23 CWE-89Unpinned action tag (@v1 vs commit SHA)
    Using a versioned tag like @v4 instead of a specific commit SHA can lead to security vulnerabilities if the package is updated in a way that introduces new risk
  • 🔴 P0 .github/workflows/lint.yml:16 CWE-89Unpinned action tag (@v1 vs commit SHA)
    Using a versioned tag like @v6 instead of a specific commit SHA can lead to security vulnerabilities if the package is updated in a way that introduces new risk
  • 🔴 P0 .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml:45 CWE-89Unpinned action tag (@v1 vs commit SHA)
    Using a versioned tag like @v5 instead of a specific commit SHA can lead to security vulnerabilities if the package is updated in a way that introduces new risk
  • 🔴 P0 .github/workflows/publish.yml:14 CWE-89Unpinned action tag (@v1 vs commit SHA)
    Using a versioned tag like @v4 instead of a specific commit SHA can lead to security vulnerabilities if the package is updated in a way that introduces new risk
  • 🔴 P0 .github/workflows/_checks.yml:23 CWE-264Unauthenticated access to actions/checkout action
    The 'actions/checkout' action is used without any authentication or authorization checks. This could allow unauthorized users to access the repository.
  • 🔴 P0 .github/workflows/lint.yml:16 CWE-264Unauthenticated access to actions/checkout action
    The 'actions/checkout' action is used without any authentication or authorization checks. This could allow unauthorized users to access the repository.
  • 🔴 P0 .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml:45 CWE-264Unauthenticated access to actions/checkout action
    The 'actions/checkout' action is used without any authentication or authorization checks. This could allow unauthorized users to access the repository.
  • 🔴 P0 .github/workflows/publish.yml:14 CWE-264Unauthenticated access to actions/checkout action
    The 'actions/checkout' action is used without any authentication or authorization checks. This could allow unauthorized users to access the repository.
  • 🟠 P1 .github/workflows/_checks.yml:23 CWE-426Unpinned search_path in SECURITY DEFINER function
    The search_path is not pinned, which could allow an attacker to shadow your functions by creating objects in earlier schemas.
  • 🟠 P1 .github/workflows/lint.yml:16 CWE-426Unpinned search_path in SECURITY DEFINER function
    The search_path is not pinned, which could allow an attacker to shadow your functions by creating objects in earlier schemas.

severity: critical · major · minor · info — local review · $0 inference · wave-dispatch · react 👍/👎 to tune

@renovate
renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/actions-checkout-7.x branch 4 times, most recently from 5749af0 to 8f881d2 Compare July 2, 2026 15:25
@renovate
renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/actions-checkout-7.x branch 4 times, most recently from 0f8d5f9 to 5544361 Compare July 25, 2026 04:12
@renovate
renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/actions-checkout-7.x branch from 5544361 to ea8eafe Compare August 1, 2026 23:14

@devin-ai-integration devin-ai-integration Bot left a comment

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Devin Review found 2 potential issues.

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timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6.0.3
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1

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🔍 Checkout pin now uniform across all workflows

The PR consolidates three previously divergent actions/checkout pins (v4.3.1, v5.0.1, v6.0.3) onto a single SHA labelled v7.0.1. A repo-wide grep confirms all eight uses: actions/checkout@... occurrences in .github/workflows/ now reference the same SHA, so the transformation is complete and consistent. Worth verifying externally that 3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 really is the v7.0.1 tag commit, since a mismatched comment/SHA pair is invisible to CI.

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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@93cb6efe18208431cddfb8368fd83d5badbf9bfd # v5.0.1
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1

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🟨 Checkout in public-repo-guard leaves the workflow's git token stored on disk

The updated checkout step in .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml:45 does not set persist-credentials: false, unlike every other checkout in this repo (.github/workflows/lint.yml:16-18, .github/workflows/release.yml:41-43, .github/workflows/_checks.yml:23-25). The job runs a vendored shell script (scripts/public-repo-guard/content-policy.sh) on PR-controlled content, so the persisted GITHUB_TOKEN in .git/config is reachable by anything the job executes.

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